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ABSTRACT 
One common way in which abuse of dominance cases could lead to action restricting 
Intellectual Property (IP) law is where an IP right holder’s refusal to deal 
inordinately restricts the development of competition. According to Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act and Article 82 of the EC, both US and EU law intervene with regard to 
de facto monopoly in refusal to deal cases based on an exclusive IP right “under 
exceptional circumstances.” The US and EU face the same legal problem and handle 
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it basically with the same principles. Yet courts on both sides of the Atlantic have not 
used a common language until now. The courts still do not use any economic 
arguments. The proposed common language that follows could be applied by the 
courts on both sides of the Atlantic for refusal to deal cases. This language  consists 
of commonly understood legal terms and economic analysis and includes two 
cumulative steps. First, the courts should examine the “possibility of competition by 
substitution” and whether a “de facto monopoly on the downstream market” exists. 
These should be the first two criteria to find an anti-competitive abuse of IP rights. 
The second step of the proposed analysis consists of an economic balancing between 
the pro- and anti-competitive effects of the refusal of the IP owner to deal. 
Convergence could bring some legal certainty in this area of law, especially through 
application of the proposed two-step test, and would become an example for the 




The prevailing view nowadays is that antitrust law by protecting competition, 
and intellectual property law, by rewarding innovation, each create incentives to 
introduce new products. At the highest level of analysis, intellectual property rights 
(IPRs)1 complement competition policies because they each share a concern to 
promote technical progress to the ultimate benefit of consumers (i.e., the theory of 
complementarity).2 Under the theory of complementarity, the intervention of 
                                                 
* The author has studied law in Greece and then wrote his Ph.D. in Munich, Germany on European 
unfair competition law. He has been scholar of the Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property and 
Competition law in Munich and the Fulbright Foundation in the scope of his research in the US. He is 
now practicing law in Greece. The author would like to thank from this position Prof. Graeme 
Dinwoodie and Prof. David Gerber of the Chicago-Kent College of Law for their help, advice and 
valuable contribution to the writing and publication of this article. I also owe special thanks to the 
Fulbright Foundation for giving me the financial support and opportunity to do my research for a whole 
year in Chicago. 
1 The present thesis focuses mainly on the exclusive rights of copyright and patent law with regard to 
IPR and not on trademark rights.  
2 See Atari Games v. Nintendo of America Inc. 897 F. 2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The two 
bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and 
competition”). The Technology Guidelines (Commission Notice – Guidelines on the application of 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology transfer agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101/03) ¶7) recognize that 
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competition laws apparently depends on effects of a given IP right and its exercise in 
the market. The IP system rests on the idea of long-term innovation incentives. That is 
entirely consistent with antitrust policy related to exclusionary conduct, which also 
focuses on dynamic competition and long-term effects. Firms are more likely to 
innovate if they are at least somewhat protected against free-riding. They are also 
more likely to innovate if they face strong competition. The right holder is enabled to 
prevent competitors from exploiting the very subject matter of protection, but may not 
prohibit the development and use of competing technology. Thus, IPRs exclude only 
competition by imitation but further competition by substitution.3  
The most common ways in which abuse of dominance cases could lead to 
action restricting IP law are when an IPR holder’s refusal to deal inordinately restricts 
the development of competition. First, there is a general category of dominance which 
applies to undertakings in a powerful position in a market where some effective 
competition continues to exist. Second, there is a special extreme form of dominance, 
a de facto monopoly, where the competitor has factually no alternatives to compete.4 
However, even when an IP protected product reaches the status of a de facto 
monopoly and falls within the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Article 82 of 
the EC, merely achieving that status is not itself viewed as abusive. A firm that has 
achieved a de facto monopoly by virtue of its investment in R&D and IP protection is 
                                                                                                                                            
generally intellectual property and competition law are not in conflict; on the contrary “both bodies of 
law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of 
resources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open and competitive 
market economy. Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by encouraging 
undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and processes. So does competition by 
putting pressure on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual property rights and 
competition are necessary to promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof”. See 
also M. Howard Morse, Standard Setting and Antitrust: The Intersection Between IP Rights and the 
Antitrust Laws, IP LITIGATOR, May-Jun. 2003, 17, 18. 
3 Hanns Ullrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Gemeinsamen Markt, in EG-
WETTBEWERBSRECHT, KOMMENTAR [EEC Competition Right, Comment], 1101, 1101-14 (Ulrich 
Immenga & Hans-Joachim Mestmäcker eds, 1997); Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko – Antitrust 
Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35 IIC 788, 805 (2004). 
4 See Part E. III. 
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normally entitled to continue to compete by exercising its exclusionary rights even in 
aftermarkets.5
However, there are cases where the abuse of a dominant position in the 
upstream market that is being facilitated by the IP right can be “transferred” to the 
neighboring downstream market. This occurs when the competition is eliminated in 
the downstream market because of the refusal of the IP right holder to license its right 
to competitors.6 European law especially has always started with the assumption that 
the leveraging of dominant positions into other markets may constitute an abuse if 
success on the neighboring market is not based on competition on the merits.7 
Conduct can be abusive if it is characterized by an instrumental use of the economic 
power bestowed by the dominant position to gain commercial advantages, usually on 
adjacent markets. Abuses in this category can also be referred to as market power 
leveraging abuses.8 The two most important variants are tying and refusals to grant 
access to a necessary input for downstream activities.9
According to Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC , both US and EU 
law intervene in de facto monopoly in refusal to deal cases based on an exclusive IP 
right “under exceptional circumstances.”10 Yet courts on both sides of the Atlantic do 
not use a common language until now, although facing the same legal problem and 
                                                 
5 Steven Anderman, Does the Microsoft Case offer a New Paradigm for the ‘Exceptional 
Circumstances’ Test and Compulsory Copyright Licenses under EC Competition Law? 1(2) 
Competition L. Rev. 1, 9 (2004). 
6 RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 200-201 (5th ed. 2003); ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMAECKER & 
HEIKE SCHWEITZER, EUROPAEISCHES WETTBEWERBSRECHT (2d ed., 2004), § 18, nr. 19; Case T-83/91, 
Tetra Pak Int’l Sa v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-755. 
7 ULRICH IMMENGA, ET AL., EG-WETTBEWERBSRECHT [EEC COMPETITION RIGHTS], 765 (1997). 
8 AXEL BECKMERHAGEN, DIE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IM US-AMERIKANISCHEN UND 
EUROPAEISCHEN KARTELLRECHT, 140 (2002). 
9 See Thomas Eilmansberger, How to Distinguish Good From Bad Competition Under Art. 82 EC, 42 
COMMON MKT L. REV. 129, 155 (2005). 
10 See among others CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), , aff’g In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Kan. 2000), reh’g denied, No. 99-1323, 2000 
U.S. App. LEXIS 9987, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001); Case C-418/01, Ims Health GMBH v. 
NDC Health GMBH, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039. See also STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW 
AND IP RIGHTS, p. 173 (1998).  
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handling it basically with the same principles (e.g. they do not presume market power 
from IP rights as such). Moreover, they do not use any economic arguments at all, 
although the US law facilitates an economic efficiency test and the EU law intends to 
adopt an economic approach for the application of Art. 82 EC (Part E. II.). 
This article points out the common legal approaches of the US and EU law 
systems, handling refusal to deal cases with regard to IP rights. Part B analyzes the 
presumption of market power from IP rights as such. It then reveals how the US and 
EU courts have approached the “exceptional circumstances” criteria for the abuse of 
IP rights in monopoly situation cases (Part C and D). Part E ascertains that the US and 
EU courts do not use economic arguments at all (E. IV.) and dictates the possibility of 
using common – from both sides understandable – legal terms (E. III., IV, V and VI.) 
for the definition of the “exceptional circumstances” and the resolution of such cases 
(E. VII.).     
B. IP Rights and the Presumption of Market Power Thereof 
I. General Rule 
Market power is the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output. 
Market power typically is associated with a departure from the conditions necessary 
for the optional functioning of a market: sufficient number of buyers or sellers, 
relatively easy conditions of entry and exit, or readily accessible information on 
market conditions. Intellectual property law potentially confers market power because 
it creates barriers to competitors’ entry into the relevant market with the same good 
and, to a certain extent, with substitute goods. The degree of market power is a 
function not only of how unique or socially desirable the product is, but also of how 
effective the property right is in erecting entry barriers that keep substitutes out of the 
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market. Antitrust is not opposed to market power, as such, if it is necessary to achieve 
efficiencies and respects the need for incentives for investment in research and 
development. If a firm builds market power through innovation, investment and 
marketing activities, this is perfectly legal.11 Market power is less durable in markets 
characterized by a high level of innovation and therefore by dependence on IP rights.
 Intellectual property cannot be presumed to establish market power.12 While 
intellectual property grants exclusive rights, these rights are not monopolies in the 
economic sense. They do not necessarily provide a large share of any commercial 
market and they do not necessarily lead to the ability to raise prices in a market. 
Where products are differentiated, a company can have constrained market power 
without being a monopolist. This is particularly likely in markets in which IP rights 
are important.13 An IP right may actually prove so successful that it creates a market 
dominant position. However, such a position is not the result of IP protection but of 
the market situation (e.g., lock-in, network effects).14 Market power can only be 
determined by an actual economic analysis of the anti- and pro-competitive aspects of 
the actual use and ownership of the specific piece of intellectual property. For 
example, a single patent or a copyright especially may have dozens of close 
substitutes.15 The mere presence of an intellectual property right does not permit an 
antitrust enforcer to skip the crucial steps of market definition and determining market 
effects. 
                                                 
11 MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (2004). 
12 Debra A. Valentine, Abuse of Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: US Perspectives and 
the INTEL Cases, 3/2000 COMPUTER L. REV. 73, 76. 
13 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, (Herbert Hovenkamp ed., 2006), § 
10-9. 
14 Drexl,supra note 3, at 792.
15 Ralph Jonas et al., Copyright and Trademark Misuse, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE: LICENSING AND LITIGATION 165, 184. 
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In the view of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 
the idea that IP rights cannot be presumed to create market power is a settled 
question.16 The ECJ adopts the same approach. In its Deutsche Grammophon 
decision,17 the ECJ observed that the exercise of exclusive distribution rights under a 
sound recording copyright does not automatically translate to dominance. Rather, 
there must be some further showing of effective competition over a considerable part 
of the relevant market. In Magill,18 the ECJ similarly held that mere ownership of IP 
rights, without more, does not establish dominance. 
Consequently, the general approach both in the US and EU is to avoid rigid 
tests and instead rely on a review of the likely economic effects to the marketplace as 
a whole, both in the short term and over the long term, factoring in incentives for pro-
competitive innovation. Moreover, the presumption of market power would 
encourage routine filing of tying antitrust claims because the accusers would not need 
to confront market realities. The increased risk of antitrust liability may discourage IP 
right owners from enforcing their rights. Both IP law and competition law seek to 
maintain dynamic, innovative markets far into the future. To that end, they properly 
are willing to tolerate a degree of private reward and market power in the present day. 
II. The Recent Illinois Toolwork v. Independent Ink Case of the Supreme Court 
In the Independent Ink case, the Federal Circuit, which handles all direct 
patent appeals in the US, held that Supreme Court precedent19 compelled it to 
                                                 
16 Russell Lombardy, The Myth of Market power: Why Market Power Should not be Presumed When 
Applying Antitrust Principles to the Analysis of the Tying Arrangements Involving Intellectual 
Property, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 449, 450-451 (1996). 
17 Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft MBH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GMBH, 1971 
E.C.R. 487, 1971C.M.L.R. 631, ¶ 16. 
18 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1995, E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 46. 
19 HU. S. v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962)H (ruling that “when the tying product is patented or 
copyrighted ... sufficiency of economic power is presumed”) , overruled by Ill HTool Works Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc.H, 126 S. Ct. 1281(2006); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 
(1984) (dictum); U. S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S.610, 619 (1977) (dictum). 
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conclude that a patent does raise a presumption of market power in an IP tying case. 
But even the Federal Circuit disagreed with the presumption. In fact, the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion invited the Supreme Court to reverse. That’s exactly what the 
Supreme Court did.20
Illinois Toolwork (ITW) manufactured printing systems made up of 
piezoelectric impulse jet print heads and inks for use in packaging assembly lines. 
Patents covered the print head, the ink bottle, and the connection between them. 
ITW’s license required OEM customers, the assembly line manufacturers, to purchase 
ink from ITW. The ITW license didn’t bind end users, though. Plaintiff claimed this 
requirement constituted a tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act. The Supreme Court ruled that “[n]othing in our opinion [in Jefferson Parish] 
suggested a rebuttable presumption of market power applicable to tying arrangements 
involving a patent on the tying good… It described the rule that a contract to sell a 
patented product on condition that the purchaser buy unpatented goods exclusively 
from the patentee is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”21 The 1988 patent 
law amendment requires “proof of market power in the relevant market” for patent 
misuse defense (35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)). The 1988 amendment invites a reappraisal of 
the per se rule announced in International Salt. The Court concluded that “tying 
arrangements involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards 
applied in cases like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish rather than under the per se rule 
applied in Morton Salt and Loew’s… Liability must be supported by proof of power 
in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.”22
The first question the Court examined was whether the presumption of market 
power in a patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law. It determined 
                                                 
20 Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281, 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
21 Id. at 1288, 547 U.S. 28. 
22 Id. at 1291, 547 U.S. 28. 
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that “Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists have all 
reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily confer market power upon 
the patentee.  Today, we reach the same conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all 
cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has 
market power in the tying product.”23 Through this decision the Supreme Court made 
clear that there is no market power presumption through the existence of patents as 
such. Instead, the courts should demand real proof of such market power.  
The second issue the Court considered was the presumption of per se illegality 
of a tying arrangement involving a patented product and the reappraisal of the per se 
rule announced in International Salt. The Court concluded that “tying arrangements 
involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards applied in cases 
like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish rather than under the per se rule applied in 
Morton Salt and Loew’s… Liability must be supported by proof of power in the 
relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.”24 Arguably, the decision 
is limited to patent tying and copyright market power presumption would therefore 
remain arguably intact. But the decision’s logic should extend to copyrights as well 
due to legal certainty and similarity of the cases. 
C. US Law 
I. First Principles 
How does the US legal system (Part C. I.) and its courts (C. II., III.) approach 
in practice the refusal to license cases?25 Is this approach principally similar to the EU 
                                                 
23 Id. at 1293, 547 U.S. 28. 
24 Id. at 1291, 547 U.S. 28. 
25 It will be a rather sketchy presentation of the US refusal-to-deal cases, since the purpose of this paper 
is just to show indicatively how the US courts have treated such cases. For a more lengthy analysis, see 
among others Kenneth L. Glazer & Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Unilateral Refusals to Deal under Section 2 
of the Sherman Act, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 749 (1995). 
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one?27 US antitrust enforcement focuses on specific anticompetitive actions, as 
judged by their effects on markets and consumer welfare. In other words, US cases at 
the intersection between intellectual property and antitrust law have been analyzed by 
examining the impact on economic incentives to innovate and balancing them against 
anticompetitive effects. There exists no quarrel with the fundamental rule that a patent 
holder has no obligation to license or sell in the first instance.28 A patent holder is not 
under any general obligation to create competition against itself within the scope of its 
patent.29 Antitrust law does not itself impose an obligation to use or license 
intellectual property rights, where such a refusal would violate the antitrust laws. 
Further, such an obligation would conflict directly with the rights granted to an 
intellectual property owner by the intellectual property laws. Thus, as a general rule 
there is no antitrust obligation either to use or license a patent. 
II. Refusal to Deal Cases 
In Data General v. Grumman Systems Support,30 the First Circuit confronted an 
aftermarket exclusion claim. The Independent Service Organizations (ISOs) were 
repairing computer hardware, and the “part” they needed access to was Data 
General’s copyrighted diagnostic software. The Court created a rebuttable 
presumption designed to take the copyright into account: “[w]hile exclusionary 
conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an 
author’s desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively 
                                                 
26 See Part D. 
27 See Part D. 
28 Valentine, supra note 12, at 74; James B. Kobak, Antitrust Treatment of Refusals to License 
Intellectual Property, in 2003 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 377, 392, (David Bender ed., 
Practising Law Institute 2003). 
29 See, e.g., Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag, 210 US 405, 429 (1908); HSCM Corp. v. 
Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981)H (“[W]here a patent has been lawfully acquired, 
subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot trigger ... liability under the antitrust 
laws.”). 
30 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). For a more analytical presentation of the refusal to deal cases in the US 
see Kobak, supra note 28, at 401. 
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valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers”.31 Rebuttable 
presumptions offer somewhat less predictability, but permit courts to delve into the 
factual context of the cases before them in order to determine competitive effect. 
In its 1997 Kodak decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a refusal to license patented 
parts was a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act32. The court reasoned that 
patents may have given Kodak a monopoly on some of its parts, but by refusing to 
sell the parts to independent repair technicians Kodak was effectively creating a 
second monopoly in the relevant market for service. The Kodak patents on 
aftermarket parts were valuable both in the market for the parts themselves and in the 
complementary market for servicing photocopiers. As far as the Ninth Circuit was 
concerned, this fact meant that Kodak had a duty to sell its parts. Otherwise, Kodak 
would reap the advantages of monopoly in both the parts market and the service 
market. 
The Federal Circuit also concluded in the Xerox case33 that a patentee can refuse 
to license or sell with immunity under the antitrust laws unless one of the following 
conditions applies: (1) The patent was obtained by fraud on the PTO; (2) The suit to 
enforce the patent was “sham” – as that term was defined by the Supreme Court34; or 
(3) The patent was used as part of a tie-in strategy to extend market power beyond the 
legitimate confines of the patent grant. 
In Trinko,35 the Supreme Court found that private plaintiffs did not state an 
antitrust claim when they alleged a failure by communications provider Verizon to 
                                                 
31 Id. at 1187. 
32 Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1094 (1998); see James S. Venit & John J. Kallaugher, Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law 
Approach, 1994 INT’L ANTITRUST AND POL’Y: ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORP. L. 
INST. 315, 317 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1994). 
33 CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., supra note 10H.H
34 HProfessional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)H. 
35 Verizon Communs. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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provide adequate assistance to its rivals. “Such liability may lessen the incentive for 
the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in economically beneficial facilities” and 
“also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners… a role for which they are ill-
suited”.36 Thus, an enforcement agency should not impose a duty to deal that it cannot 
reasonably supervise because this risks assuming the day-to-day controls 
characteristic of a regulatory agency. In Trinko, the Court gave a number of reasons 
for refusing to impose a duty to deal. These reasons include the absence of an earlier, 
voluntary business relationship between the defendant and its competitors and the 
presence of an extensive regulatory framework dealing with the issues that the 
plaintiff sought to have governed by the antitrust laws. 
III. The Particularity of US Law with Regard to the Merger and Misuse 
Doctrines  
US law does not approach interface issues between Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust law only through Section 2 of the Sherman Act as abuse of monopoly, but 
also internally in the IP system itself through the doctrines of merger and misuse , 
which limit the legal monopoly of the IP owner. The merger doctrine states that if an 
idea and the way to express it are so intertwined that the ways of expression have little 
possible variation, there will not be copyright infringement, lest the copyright prevent 
others from expressing the same idea (i.e., idea/expression distinction).37
Moreover, the US courts use the misuse defense, another flexible and 
powerful tool, to avoid the adverse effects of compulsory licensing on innovation.38 
Actually, defendants bring the misuse doctrine as an “aggressive” defense against the 
                                                 
36 Id. at 407, 414-415. 
37 Merger Doctrine – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia,  
Hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merger_doctrine. (lastH visited Jan 4, 2006) 
38 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and IP: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 535, 550 (2001). 
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plaintiff who misuses an IP patent or copyright. The courts can use the flexible misuse 
doctrine as a balancing tool to decide cases at the interface of intellectual property and 
competition law. But such a misuse defense could not be practically applied in EU 
law because of the legal uncertainty of such a fact-specific misuse approach and the 
unforeseeable weakening of IP rights in favor of the competition process, especially 
in a fiction like the Internal Market of the EU. The misuse doctrine “arose to restrain 
practices that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive 
strength from the patent right, and thus were deemed to be contrary to public 
policy.”39 The policy rationale was that the misuse doctrine would prevent the IP 
owner from using the IP right to obtain benefits beyond those granted by statute. 
While the doctrine “has evolved separately from the antitrust laws ... it is used to 
attack patent licensing practices that are claimed to be undesirable from a public 
policy standpoint.”40 If successful, a misuse defense renders the patent unenforceable 
against anyone until the misuse has been eliminated and the effects on the 
marketplace have been purged. 
As a general rule, the misuse doctrine has a broader scope than that of antitrust 
laws, but the two overlap significantly as long as antitrust concerns such as market 
structure, intent, and anticompetitive effect are met. Yet the misuse doctrine may limit 
the validity of an IP right for behavior that does not rise to the level of an antitrust 
violation. With the exception of non-economic reasons why the doctrine should apply 
(e.g., fraud on the patent office), this effect represents a serious flaw in the doctrine 
itself.41 The test the Federal Circuit uses in its patent misuse jurisprudence examines 
                                                 
39 HMallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)H. 
40 See Roger B. Andewalt, Competition Policy and the Patent Misuse Doctrine, Remarks Before the 
D.C. Bar Association, 1982 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 41, 42. 
41 HZenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969)H. 
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whether “the patentee has impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of 
the patent with anti-competitive effect.”42
Two recent US cases shed light on the danger to eliminate competitive 
products from a secondary market through the imposition of IP rights. Lexmark 
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.43 referred to ink for printers. 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.44 involved the market-control 
of remote controls for automatic garage doors. In each case the competitors of the 
copyright owner at the secondary market first needed  access to the protected 
computer program – only possible after circumvention of the technical precautionary 
measures – and then needed the reproduction of the program in order to offer 
competitive ink for printers or remote controls. The Sixth Circuit doubted the 
copyrightability of the relevant computer programs. Where external factors like 
technical specifications, hardware and software standards, programming practices, or 
even efficiency considerations limit the choice of possible alternatives on the specific 
computer program, the Sixth Circuit held that a merger (“merger doctrine”45) of the 
(non-copyrightable) idea and the expression occurs. As a result, there is no 
copyrightability for the computer program. Unlike US law, the European copyright 
regime does not have any merger or misuse doctrines that could facilitate flexibility in 
the legal judgment of a case. This absence seems problematic in light of the relatively 
shallow threshold, particularly for the protection of computer programs. 
                                                 
42 HWindsurfing Int’l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)H. 
43 387 F. 3d 522, (6th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied, No. 03-5400, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 27422, reh’g, en 
banc, denied, No. 03-5400, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3330. 
44 381 F. 3d 1178, (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g, en banc, denied, No. 04-1118, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
27232, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005). 
45 See Baker v. Selden, 101 US 99 (1879). 
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D. EU Law 
I. First Principles 
Due to institutional and structural impediments, EU law approaches the 
interaction between IP and competition law through Article 82 EC.46 The flexible 
misuse doctrine cannot apply EU-wide because it is difficult for the varying national 
intellectual property policies to be incorporated into the construction of Union-wide 
competition law. In addition, it is impossible for the national courts to incorporate 
European competition policy concerns into their national intellectual property laws.  
Under Article 82 EC, competition law can only act in “exceptional 
circumstances” to limit the lawful exercise of intellectual property rights. The 
existence or the essence of intellectual property rights is not affected by the rules on 
competition.47 Under EU law today, the Volvo decision still defines the core principle 
in applying Art. 82 EC to intellectual property matters: the refusal to license a right as 
such does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position.48 In other words, EU law, 
like US law, disturbs the balance between the strong IP protection and competition 
law in favor of the latter only in “exceptional circumstances.” Otherwise, the rule 
remains that IP rights should be enforced.    
II. Refusal to Deal Cases 
In the Oscar Bronner49 case the ECJ identified the required “exceptional 
circumstances” as involving the following conditions: (1) that the refusal would be 
likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market by Oscar Bronner; 
                                                 
46 ANDREAS HEINEMANN, IMMATERIALGÜTERSCHUTZ IN DER WETTBEWERBSORDNUNG [INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET ORDER], 303 (2002). 
47 INGE GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EC LAW, 104 (1996). 
48 Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK), Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, ¶ 8. 
49 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GMBH v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-UND Zeitschriftenverlag GMBH, 1998 
E.C.R. 1-7817. 
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(2) that the refusal could not be objectively justified; and (3) that the service be 
indispensable to carrying on Oscar Bronner’s business, in that there was no actual or 
potential substitute. 
The ECJ then ruled in its Magill decision50 that to find an abuse there must be 
three cumulative conditions: (i) the product to which the refusal to supply relates is an 
indispensable input required for the marketing of a new product which the holder of 
the IPR does not offer and for which there is a potential demand; (ii) there is no 
justification for such refusal; and (iii) the dominant company reserves for itself a 
secondary downstream market.51 The ECJ’s first condition requires two elements: the 
indispensability of the input and the failure of the IP right owner to exploit its rights to 
offer the downstream product. The status of the second condition identified by the 
ECJ depends on whether “objective justification” includes the reward for innovation 
that underlies the grant of a monopoly under IP law. The third condition identified by 
the ECJ is arguably the only condition inconsistent with the existence of the IP right, 
since a refusal to license is inherent in the legal monopoly conferred by the IP right. 
The ECJ noted that the dominant position of the TV companies was based on 
the de facto monopoly enjoyed by them by force of circumstances over the 
information used to compile listings for TV programs.52 The decision emphasized that 
the true test of market dominance was possession of economic strength in a market 
(i.e., the ability to behave independently of competitors and consumers53). Yet that 
test presupposes an economic analysis of market strength. If mere ownership of the IP 
right occurs in conjunction with a de facto monopoly on a market, and that is 
                                                 
50 Joined cases C-241/91 and 242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, at ¶¶ 52-
58. 
51 See among others Matthias Leistner, The European Development from Magill to IMS Health 
compared to recent German and US Case Law, 2005 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WETTBEWERBSRECHT (ZWER) 
[J. COMPETITION L.] 138, 144. 
52 See ANDERMAN, supra note 10, at 209. 
53 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Indus. Michelin v. Commission 1983 E.C.R. 3461, ¶ 30. 
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sufficient to justify a finding of dominance, then the existence of ownership alone can 
confer dominance.      
In IMS Health,54 the ECJ concluded that it is possible to interfere with the 
specific subject matter of an IP right on the basis of Article 82 EC, imposing 
compulsory licensing on the right holder when four special circumstances exist: (a) 
the protected product or service must be indispensable for carrying on a particular 
business; (b) the refusal would exclude any competition on the secondary market; (c) 
the refusal prevents emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer 
demand; and (d) the refusal is not objectively justified.55 In reaching this conclusion, 
the ECJ stated that it was sufficient that “a potential market or even a hypothetical 
market can be identified,” noting that these circumstances would occur when “the 
products or services are indispensable in order to carry on a particular business and 
where there is an actual demand for them on the part of undertakings which seek to 
carry on the business for which they are indispensable”.56 The consumers’ interest in 
IMS Health did not consist in getting a new product, but in having a larger number of 
competing supplies in the downstream service market to offer a comparable service 
using the same brick structure.57 
In Microsoft,58 the Commission examined the indispensability of interface 
information against the existence of actual or potential substitutes. According to the 
Commission, neither reverse engineering nor open industry standards nor the access 
ensured by the communication licensing program created in the US were alternative 
ways for Microsoft competitors to achieve interoperability of their products. The 
                                                 
54 Case C-418/01, IMS Health, E.C.R. I-5039. 
55 See also among others Daniel Kanter, IP and Compulsory Licensing on Both Sides of the Atlantic-An 
Appropriate Antitrust Remedy or a Cutback on Innovation, 2006 E.C.L.R. 27(7) 351, 355; Leistner, 
supra note 51 at 148.  
56 Id. at ¶ 44.  
57 See Drexl, supra note 3 at 803.
58 Commission decision in case COMP/C-3/37.792, EC Commission/Microsoft.  
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Commission advocates that “Microsoft’s refusal puts Microsoft’s competitors at a 
strong disadvantage in the workgroup server operating system market, to an extent 
where there is a risk of elimination of competition.”59 Yet the crucial question for the 
Commission seems to be, if the refusal to license reduces the incentives to innovate in 
the whole industry. Microsoft’s incentives to innovate in the workgroup server 
operating system will be reduced in case of non-disclosure because of the absence of 
competitive pressure. The European case concentrated on the problems of server 
software markets and integration of the media player into the operating system, 
whereas the US case focused on the browser and the Java problem.60 Due to these 
differences, no further analysis of Microsoft is included here.  
E. The Way of Converging the Two systems by Speaking the Same Language of 
Law and Economics 
I. Introduction 
 The above analysis demonstrating how the U.S.’s and E.U.’s law systems 
approach the interface between IP and competition law with regard to refusal to deal 
cases has shown one thing.   Even if there are institutional, procedural and structural 
differences, there is a language that can be similarly spoken by the US and EU courts. 
This language consists of commonly understood legal terms and economic analysis.61 
The proposed common language that could be applied by the courts on both sides of 
the Atlantic for refusal to deal cases includes two steps. First, the courts should 
                                                 
59 Id. at recital 589. See also VALENTINE KORAH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EC 
COMPETITION RULES 155 (2006). 
60 Andreas Heinemann, Compulsory Licensing and Product Integration in European Competition Law, 
IIC 2005, 63, 75. There could be a comparison of the US and EU case only with regard to the remedies 
imposed; see id. at 78.  
61 See Part E. III. 
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examine if there is the “possibility of competition by substitution”62 and a “de facto 
monopoly on the downstream market”63.   These two legal terms should be the first 
two criteria for finding an anti-competitive abuse of IP rights.65 The second step of 
the proposed analysis consists of an economic balancing between the pro- and anti-
competitive effects of the refusal of the IP owner to deal.66
Especially now that both US and EU competition laws (Section 2 Sherman 
Act and Art. 82 EC67) seem to gravitate toward an economic-based approach, the 
possibility of aligning the legal and economic language of the Supreme Court and the 
ECJ seems more feasible than ever. This proposed common language is not only a 
game with words, as its application to the hypothetical resolution of two current cases 
before the ECJ and the US Supreme Court shows.69 It is a method of communication 
between the two legal systems; a way for them to see the same things similarly 
through a common legal treatment. It is a method of converging two legal systems 
that have the most developed IP and Antitrust laws. This convergence could bring 
some legal certainty in this area of law, especially through the application of the 
proposed two-step test.  Finally, it would become an example for the resolution of 
refusal to deal cases in IP and competition law for other developing countries.    
II. The Current Discussion in the EU for the Application of Art. 82 EC on an 
“Economic Approach” Basis 
The EU Commission has begun lately to reflect internally on the policy 
underlying Article 82 EC and the way in which the Commission should enforce that 
                                                 
62 See Part E. IV. 
63 See Part E. V. 
64 See Part E. V. 
65 Similarly for an abandonment of the “new product”requirement, see Leistner, supra note 51, at 161. 
66 See Part E. VI. 
67 See Part E. II. 
68 See Part E. II. 
69 See Part E. VII. 
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policy.70 The resulting paper suggests a framework for the continued rigorous 
enforcement of Article 82. The framework builds on the economic analysis used in 
recent cases and sets out one possible methodology for the assessment of some 
common abusive practices. An economic-based approach to the application of Article 
82 implies that the assessment of each specific case will not be undertaken based on 
the form that a particular business practice takes  (for  example,  exclusive  dealing,  
tying,  etc.). Rather, the approach will  be  based  on  the assessment of the anti-
competitive effects generated by business behavior. This implies that competition law  
authorities  will  need  to  identify  a  competitive  harm  and  assess  the  extent  a 
negative effect on consumers is potentially outweighed by efficiency gains. 
Identifying a competitive harm requires finding a consistent business behavior based 
on sound economics and supported by facts and empirical evidence. An economics-
based approach will naturally lend itself to a “rule of reason”  approach  to 
competition policy since  careful  consideration  of  the  specifics  of  each  case  is  
needed; therefore, this approach is likely to be especially difficult under per se rules. 
In an effects-based approach, the focus is on the use of well-established 
economic analysis. The ultimate goal is to focus on the important competitive harms 
while preserving and encouraging efficiency. The economic approach to Article 82 
EC is supposed to provide a flexible framework that fosters increased productivity 
and growth to the benefits of consumers. The standard for assessing if a given practice 
is detrimental to competition or if it is a legitimate tool of competition should be 
determined from the effects of the practice on consumers. 
Moving from a form-based to an effects-based approach has important 
implications for procedure. While under a form-based approach, it is enough to verify 
                                                 
70 See Press Release, European Commission, Competition: Commission publishes discussion paper on 
abuse of dominance, IP/05/1626 (December 12, 2005), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do 
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(i) that a firm is dominant and (ii) that a certain form of behavior is practiced, an 
effects-based approach requires verification of competitive harm. To verify 
competitive harm, the authority must analyze the practice in question to see whether 
there is a consistent and verifiable economic account of significant competitive harm. 
This verification should be both based on sound economic analysis and grounded on 
fact; however, it is necessary to ensure the consistency of the treatment of the various 
practices that produce the same anticompetitive effect. This also helps enhance the 
predictability and, consequently, the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. 
Once a competitive harm has been identified and the relevant facts established, 
the next step should be to see if pro-competitive effects might serve as a 
counterbalance.  Again, an economic approach first identifies the nature of the benefit 
for competition and the facts that need to be established. It is only after these steps 
that a proper balance can be assessed. It is obvious from the above-mentioned that the 
general framework, under which Art. 82 EC is applied, is quickly approaching the 
way Section 2 Sherman Act is applied. EU competition law distances itself from the 
normative approach, encompassing the principles of “objective justification” and 
“proportionality”, which were mainly followed, until recently, to apply Art. 82 EC on 
competitive conduct.71  Presently, the law seems willing to follow the economic 
effects-based approach of the US law. 
III. The Courts Should Finally Speak a Common Legal and Economic Language 
As shown above, the courts on each side of the Atlantic have not managed to 
use a common legal nor economic language; although it is possible given that the 
basic application of concepts such as innovation, competition, and indispensability are 
                                                 
71 WHISH, supra note 6, at 189; MESTMAECKER & SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at § 15, nr. 39. 
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seemingly the same.72 In particular, the Supreme Court and the ECJ have omitted 
sound economic analysis, which tends to be internationally understood and 
recognized, from its decisions. Moreover, the two court systems use a legal language 
with terms that cannot be understood nor adopted by the other. For example, the ECJ 
ruled in IMS Health that “the refusal in question must concern a product that is 
indispensable for the production of a new product for which there is an unsatisfied 
consumer demand.” Instead, it could rule “the refusal in question must concern a 
product that creates a de facto monopoly for the competition by substitution in the 
downstream market and thus causes anticompetitive effects in the market.”73 The 
substitutions of “indispensability” with “de facto monopoly on the downstream 
market” or “new product in the downstream market” with “possibility of competition 
by substitution” commonly conceptualize objectively these ideas both in the US and 
EU. The next section will analyze the legal terms proposed and commonly understood 
by US and EU enforcers and their definitions. 
IV. The Distinction Between Competition by Substitution and Competition by 
Imitation and Its Implications 
In its Guidelines on the Transfer Technology Regulation (TTBER)74, the 
Commission has sufficiently made clear that IP rights and competition law coincide in 
promoting innovation and dynamic competition by excluding imitation.75 The 
objective of the IP right is to prevent others from imitating so as to encourage them to 
                                                 
72 Kanter, supra note 55, at 363. 
73 In that sense, Leistner, supra note 51, at 152, discusses “a new and economically orientated 
indispensability-test.” 
74 EU Council Regulation No. 772/2004; see generally Carlin & Pautke, The HLast of its Kind: The 
Review of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, 24 NW. J. OF INT’L LAW &  BUS. 601 
(2004)HHH; Cyril Ritter, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Under EC Competition Law, 
31(3) LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION 161 (2004), available at SSRN: 
Hhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=726703H. 
75 Ullrich, supra note 3, at 1101-1114.  
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compete by substitution. Intellectual property protection reacts to the phenomenon of 
copying intangible goods by restricting the freedom to compete by imitation, but does 
not exclude the possibility of developing a superior intangible good that would 
compete with the prior good (i.e., competition by substitution). Dynamic efficiency, 
creating incentives for innovation and competitive behavior, is enhanced by 
competition by substitution and requires the exclusion of competition by imitation.76
Two decisions of the ECJ illustrate the distinction between competition by 
substitution and competition by imitation . The competitor who simply intends to 
imitate the achievements of the right holder does not deserve any protection by 
competition law (IMS Health), whereas, a competitor would be prevented from 
placing a new product in the market without the grant of the license (Magill). It is 
difficult however to imagine that the ECJ’s “new product rule” would work in a case, 
where the IP system is not deficient but rather external circumstances prevent the 
competitor from placing a new product in the market. In these situations, such as 
cases involving software licensing agreements, competition by substitution (i.e., a 
new product) is not hindered by the refusal to grant the license77, but rather by the 
lock-in effect and possible network effects in the given market. Thus if there are 
network and lock-in effects limiting any market access, the examination requires a 
concrete market analysis. 
Network effects arise when the value of a network increases with the number 
of its users. A single firm, perhaps because it is the first mover, may become the only 
supplier of certain products or services because of the value of compatibility or 
interoperability. Consumers are more likely to remain with the established network 
because of their sunk costs (sometimes referred to as “lock-in”), and the suppliers of 
                                                 
76 Drexl,supra note 3, at 805.
77 See, e.g., the copyright in the IMS Health case, supra note 54. 
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complementary products will tailor those products to the established network while 
they resist preparing products for would-be challengers. In that event, network 
dominance itself becomes a formidable barrier to entry. In Europe, the Commission 
stated that where a de facto industry standard emerges such as the software or the 
phone service industry,  
the main concern will then be to ensure that these standards are as open as 
possible and applied in a clear non-discriminatory manner. To avoid 
elimination of competition in the relevant market(s), access to the standard 
must be possible for third parties on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms.78
 
The ECJ uses a concept of innovation which applies to some cases but not 
others.79 If the net effect of compelling a license is “a positive level of innovation of 
the whole industry, then intervening is considered welfare enhancing”.80 Currently, 
protection has moved upstream to give right holders control over a particular 
innovation opportunity in exchange for contributing the insight that created it. 
Therefore, competition law must be structured to prevent right holders from 
leveraging control over the innovation opportunity in one product market into control 
over innovation opportunities in other product markets. 
The first criterion of “possibility of competition by substitution”, which is 
proposed here, presupposes that there is no technical or de facto possibility of 
substitution. For example, the copyright-protected TV-listings in the Magill case 
could not be substituted. A substitution is especially more difficult by copyrights than 
by other rights, such as patents. A bottleneck situation can result not only due to the 
technical impossibility of substitution, but also because a substitute is economically 
                                                 
78 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal 
cooperation agreements, OJ C 3 (2001). 
79 Josef Drexl, Abuse of Dominance in Licensing and Refusal to License, EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
LAW ANNUAL 2005: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW, (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2007).  
80 See Microsoft, supra note 58, at ¶ 783.  
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impossible. This does not depend on subjective intentions but rather on objective 
economic criteria. The development of a profitable substitute must be objectively 
impossible in order to find abuse of IP rights. 
V. The Leveraging Element and De Facto Monopoly 
By refusing to license the intellectual property right, the dominant company is 
not merely using the right in the market for the product or service, with which the 
right is primarily concerned, but the company is also using the right to obtain leverage 
or to protect itself from competition in another market.81 This so-called “monopoly 
leveraging”82 applies in two-market situations where a competitor in the downstream 
market gains control over a necessary input and does not offer a better or a cheaper 
product in the downstream market, but only uses its power to harm consumers in that 
market by shutting out its competitors.83
The main function of the IP rights in such cases is to exclude third parties 
from the secondary market, which stands closest to the primary market.84 When a 
                                                 
81 See Temple Lang, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property in European Community Antitrust 
Law, DOJ/FTC Hearings 19 (Washington D.C., May 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020522langdoc.pdf). 
82 When a monopolist abuses its monopoly power in one market to gain an improper advantage or to 
destroy threatened competition in an adjacent market in which it also operates. See, e.g., HAdvanced 
Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 150 (4th Cir. 1990)H (“The central 
concern in an essential facilities claim is whether market power in one market is being used to create or 
further a monopoly in another market.”); HTwin Labs., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 
568 (2d Cir. 1990)H (“The policy behind prohibiting denial of an essential facility to a competitor ... is 
to prevent a monopolist in a given market ... from using its power to inhibit competition in another 
market.”). 
83 According to Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, compulsory licensing can be 
required under US law where the IP right is deemed to be an essential facility without market 
leveraging. See Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine 
Under US Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 462 (2002). Paul Marquardt & Mark Leddy, The 
Essential Facilities Doctrine and IP Rights: A Response to Pitofsky, Patterson and Hooks, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 847, 851 (2003) have a different opinion. To the extent that Section 2 of Sherman Act 
prohibits monopolization as opposed to the mere existence of market power, it would appear that the 
possibility of successful leveraging in a downstream market is an indispensable requirement in an IP 
case brought under Section 2 if the existence of IP rights is to be maintained. 
84 The abuse of third markets includes conduct, where an entity attempts to expand its monopoly in one 
market to a neighboring one. See Cases 6 and 7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano u. Commercial 
Solvents/Commission (1974), H223H E.C.J.; CaseH 311/84H, Centre Belge d´études de marché 
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dominant firm tries to transfer its market power to another neighboring market to 
shield against any competition, there is certainly an influence on the competition 
process. In the primary market, the exclusionary effect of the IP right takes 
precedence over competition law. There should be control over the IP right through 
competition law only when the IP owner prevents access to a secondary market. 
Without acknowledging that the IMS Health case was a typical, leveraging case, the 
ECJ ruled that a refusal to license IMS Health could very possibly lead to a total cut-
off of a secondary market.85
The competitor must also require the IP right in order to access the secondary 
market. The second criterion, proposed here, is the “de facto monopoly on a 
downstream market” referring to the phenomenon, where the IP right cannot be 
substituted and blocks access to another market. The abuse in this case consists of 
monopoly leveraging, the transfer of market power to other markets.86 When there are 
one or two markets related to each other, the formula of “functional 
interchangeability” applies. Only if the product of the competitor is not functionally 
interchangeable with that of the dominant firm, can one speak about two separate 
markets. There should be a case-by-case market analysis. The switching costs, 
analyzed by way of thorough market analysis including eventual network and lock-in 
effects, will be the decisive factor in assessing the indispensability of the de facto 
monopoly standard.87
                                                                                                                                            
(Télémarketing)/SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télediffusion (CLT) u. Information publicité 
Benelux (IPB)  (1985), E.C.J. H3261H. 
85 Heinemann, supra note 60, at 73. The need for two markets is also stressed by Lang, supra note 81, 
at 11. 
86 Similarly Leistner, supra note 51, at 150. 
87 Id., at 154. 
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VI. Economic Balancing 
An economic analysis at this level should include a balance between the ex 
post allocative efficiency gains, which can be realized by mandating access, with the 
ex ante dynamic efficiency gains, which can be protected by refusing access.88 On the 
one hand, requiring a dominant firm holding an IP right, as an essential facility, to 
share it with one or several competitors will stimulate competition in downstream 
markets, thus promoting ex post (allocative) efficiency. On the other hand, mandatory 
sharing may reduce the return of the IP right holder and thus decrease its ex ante 
incentives to invest and compete dynamically.89 At this point, a difficult and 
controversial, among economists, economic balancing between the pro- and anti-
competitive effects of a refusal to deal should take place.90 There must be an overall 
balancing, especially taking into consideration the seriousness of hindering access to 
the secondary market. 
VII. Hypothetical resolution of cases through the common language 
This section of the article will examine how the above-mentioned ideas apply 
in practice. Specifically, the article proposes a hypothetical resolution to two cases 
before the ECJ and the Supreme Court through the use of the proposed common 
language. These cases are both fairly recent and have caused a great deal of  
discussion. 
                                                 
88 The rather limited knowledge of the author on economics does not allow him to propose a specific 
economic model of analysis, but just the general framework that this analysis should pursue. 
89 See Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 EC: What Can the EU Learn From the US 
Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft, IMS and Deutsche Telekom?, 41 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1519, 1539 (2004). 
90 See the general review of the criterion of economic efficiency by Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, 
Abuse of a dominant position and economic efficiency, 2003 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WETTBEWERBSRECHT (ZWER) 59. 
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1. IMS Health 
In IMS Health91, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled, on a reference, 
under what circumstances a dominant company’s refusal to grant a copyright license 
will amount to the abuse of that company’s dominant position.  In this case, two 
German Companies, IMS Health (“IMS”) and NDC Health (“NDC”) both collected 
various data on pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions.  The data provided by IMS to 
pharmaceutical laboratories was formatted in a particular structure and was distributed 
free of charge.  In the late 1980’s, a director of IMS left to set up another company, 
which sold similar data to that sold by IMS and which worked with very similar 
structures to IMS. NDC subsequently acquired this company. In an action before the 
local courts in Germany, it was held that the IMS structure system for data collection 
was protected by copyright. However, the national court held that IMS could not 
refuse to grant a copyright license to NDC if such refusal would, under EU law, 
amount to an abuse of a dominant position. The national court referred certain 
questions to the ECJ regarding the circumstances under which such behavior would 
constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 
The first requirement of the “possibility of competition by substitution” is 
present here since in practice there is a competitor’s inability to duplicate the product. 
IMS had acquired a normal industry standard through its brick structure. Without 
access to this structure, there was no technical or economical possibility for NDC to 
compete.92 However, the second requirement of “de facto monopoly on the 
downstream market” seems to be absent here. There is no other secondary market in 
this case, not even for a different product.93 The brick-structure does not prevent the 
                                                 
91 IMS Health, supra note 54. 
92 Id., at ¶ 28. 
93 In the above-mentioned Magill case for example the plaintiff wanted to bring a TV-program listing 
for the whole week, in contradiction to the daily TV-programs that the defendants were offering. 
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access to another downstream market because there is only one market, which is for 
pharmaceutical products. Since the second requirement for finding an abuse of IP 
rights is absent, there would be no need to proceed to the third requirement, which is 
an economic balancing of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of the refusal; 
therefore, the refusal is legitimate. 
If we applied the above-mentioned analysis on the IMS Health case of the 
ECJ, there would be no possibility of an antitrust violation.94 Even if one could 
identify two different markets, one in the sales-data of the pharmaceuticals95 and the 
other in the structure of the databank, the requirements would not be met to excuse an 
antitrust violation. A flexible solution of such a problematic situation, taking into 
account IMS Health’s huge investments in the structure for at least 30 years, could 
eventually emerge, not in competition law, but in copyright law, through a narrow 
application of the idea/expression distinction at the copyrightability level. A similar 
solution is offered in the US law by the merger and scene-a-faire doctrines. 
2. Verizon v. Trinko 
Before analyzing this case, the article will briefly reexamine the facts of the 
case.  
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposes upon an incumbent 
local exchange carrier (LEC) the obligation to share its telephone network 
with competitors, (see 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)), including the duty to provide 
access to individual network elements on an “unbundled” basis, (see § 
251(c)(3)). New entrants, so-called competitive LECs, combine and resell 
these unbundled network elements (UNEs). Petitioner Verizon 
Communications Inc., the incumbent LEC in New York State, has signed 
interconnection agreements with rivals such as AT&T, as § 252 obliges it 
to do, detailing the terms on which it will make its network elements 
available. Respondent Trinko LLP, a New York City law firm, was a local 
telephone service customer of AT&T. The day after Verizon entered its 
                                                 
94 Similarly, Dr. Matthias Casper, Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Begründung von Zwangslizenzen, 166 
ZHR 685, 703 (2002). 
95 Even though the sales-data are not usable without the structure; in other words, there is no 
independent product. 
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consent decree with the FCC, respondent filed a complaint in the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of itself and a class 
of similarly situated customers. The complaint alleged that Verizon had 
filled rivals’ orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive 
scheme to discourage customers from becoming or remaining customers 
of competitive LECs, thus impeding the competitive LECs’ ability to enter 
and compete in the market for local telephone service. Complainant 
sought damages and injunctive relief for violation of § 2 of the Sherman 
Act, pursuant to the remedy provisions of §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton 
Act.96
 
The peculiarity of this case is the existence of a regulatory scheme 
(Telecommunication Act), which Justice Scalia assumed was sufficient for the 
resolution of this case and avoided any further antitrust analysis. Apart from the 
Telecommunication Act’s regulation, it would be interesting to see how the common 
legal language proposed here could be applied in this case. The first requirement of 
“possibility of competition by substitution” is present here, since competitor is unable 
in practice to duplicate the interconnection service. As the decision clearly states, “the 
services allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or available to the public.” 
Without access to Verizon’s platform, there was no technical or economical 
possibility for AT&T to compete. Moreover, the second requirement of “de facto 
monopoly on the downstream market” is present here. As the decision notes, “[t]he 
sharing obligation imposed by the Telecommunication Act created ‘something brand 
new’ –  ‘the wholesale market for leasing network elements.’”97 In other words, there 
is another secondary downstream market, in this case, where competition is de facto 
prohibited because of the monopoly of Verizon in the upstream market.  The Court 
then should proceed to the third requirement and engage in an economic balancing of 
the pro- and anti-competitive effects of Verizon’s refusal to share interconnection 
services. The economic analysis would probably result in an order for Verizon to 
                                                 
96 Abstract from the Supreme Court decision, supra note 35, 540 U.S. at 404-405. 
97 540 U.S. at 410 (quoting Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S., 467, 528 (2002)). 
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share its services with AT&T and several other competitors since that would stimulate 
competition in the downstream market for leasing network elements. The stimulation 
of competition would promote ex post allocative efficiency, outweighing any short-
term ex ante dynamic efficiency gains, which can be protected by refusing access to 
Verizon’s services. 
F. Conclusion 
The EC competition law is becoming increasingly economically orientated 
with the application of Art. 82 EC approaching US law, where an element of 
anticompetitive conduct must be present. The idea of an economics-based antitrust 
regime is no longer a greatly controversial concept. This approach facilitates 
objectivity, predictability, and transparency, although even economic theory does not 
have all the answers and probably never will.98
Competition law and IP law are converging in their aims of ensuring an 
optimum balance between access to markets and protection of invention. A model 
with narrower IP protection and strong competition policy intervening only under 
exceptional circumstances suggests an alternative model for innovation. The IP rights 
are thus not protected in abstracto, but as a substantial medium of competition. If the 
advantages of the IP system are outweighed by disadvantages on the competition by 
substitution, only negative effects of competition by imitation remain. If the 
resolution of an absence of any competition is offered either by IP internally, like in 
the US through the doctrines of merger and misuse, or externally through competition 
law, like in EU law, the resolution becomes the matter of a systematic approach. The 
best solution would consist of limiting the IP right to its appropriate scope through a 
                                                 
98 K. Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 
375, 378 (2005). 
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flexible IP-related approach, such as the misuse doctrine, relying on the 
complementary goals of IP and competition law. 
However, an American-type synthesis of intellectual property and competition 
law is more difficult in Europe because the European Union currently possesses a 
Union-wide competition law in contrast to mostly national intellectual property laws. 
As a result, it is more difficult for the varying national intellectual property policies to 
be incorporated into the construction of Union-wide competition law. It is also 
difficult, albeit not impossible, for the national courts to incorporate European 
competition policy concerns into their national intellectual property laws. These 
impediments to the harmonization of intellectual property law with competition law in 
Europe mean that the interactions of these two sets of laws are likely to produce a less 
than efficient result. 
It is clear that this use of common legal language between US and EU law can 
also be used to describe cases involving both IP and competition law. Common terms 
may be used to describe and resolve cases where IP law has to take into account 
competition policy issues. These situations are numerous, including cases referring to 
the misuse, merger, and scene-a-faire doctrines and functionality problems.         
In the case of network effects, where competition by substitution is not 
possible, the right holder’s freedom to license would result in overbroad protection. 
The IP right does not have the capacity to promote dynamic competition, and the law 
has to impose a duty to license the IP right to competitors at reasonable fees. In the 
rare market situations where IP protection does not reach its goal of promoting 
dynamic efficiency, a duty to deal should be accepted so as to guarantee at least 
allocative efficiency. From an economic point of view, compulsory licensing should 
occur if exploitation by the licensee has allocative advantages in comparison to 
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exploitation by the right owner, and there is no de facto competition by imitation 
anymore.99
Even in the market for the copyright of the brick structure, the copyright was 
not the cause of IMS Health’s dominant position. The problem is that the lock-in 
effect excludes any other method of collecting data from the relevant market. When a 
company holds market power, this company by definition will not feel pressure to 
innovate. Also, it may attempt to create barriers for potential competitors and forget to 
improve its own products by continuing to introduce superior technology in the 
market. Still, competition may be restored by allowing imitation. Although the 
exclusive right is not the cause of market power, the competition problem may be 
cured by restricting the exercise of the exclusive right.100
The rationale for the imposition of a duty to deal under these circumstances is 
not to create competition in the market subject to intellectual property protection 
because exclusivity is within the statutory monopoly conferred by the patent or 
copyright statutes. Rather, it is to allow competition in complementary markets that 
are not within the scope of the patent or copyright monopoly. Patent and copyright 
owners will continue to be able to fully exploit the monopoly conferred by those 
grants, and they will be limited only in attempts to extend that monopoly beyond the 
proper scope of the grant. Therefore, the holder of a dominant position must make 
considerable efforts to keep the barriers to entry into the neighboring markets as low 
as possible. The solution is to keep the relevant markets as open as possible.101 That 
result would best advance the principal goal of the antitrust laws, to increase 
competition and maximize consumer welfare; a goal that is hardly inconsistent with 
the goals of patent or copyright law.
                                                 
99 Drexl, supra note 3 at 807.
100 Ullrich, supra note 3, at 1250-1252. 
101 Heinemann, supra note 60, at 82. 
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